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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Reply Brief is intended to be a reply to the four
Briefs filed by the Respondents. Before taking up a discussion
of the Points raised by Respondents there are some questions
of law and of facts which Respondents claim to exist which
deserve a brief mention. It will be observed that there are
two questions raised in Appellants' original Brief that are not
mentioned in either the Brief of the Corporation of the
President or Zions Securities. It is in effect alleged in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Complaint that the
purported sale of the property at First South and State Streets
is null and void pursuant to and under the provisions of
U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38, in that, four members of the City Commission who participated in the purported sale were members
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and as such
interested in the trust fund of defendant Corporation of the
President and of Zions Securities, and also that one of the
cardinal principles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints is that its members shall comply with the announced
desires of its leaders, and particularly its President and his
Counselors; that the leaders of such Church secured the assistance of Gus P. Backman to secure the consent of the City
Commissioners to sell the property at First South and State
Streets. In our original Brief we have cited numerous cases
which hold that where a conflict of interests exists between
the commissioners of a city and a prospective purchaser of City
property any contract had under such circumstances is void,
especially where there is in existence a law such as U.C.A.
1953, 10-6-38. It should be kept in mind that not only do the
members of the city commission who voted in favor of the
6
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purported sale have a monetary interest in the property of
the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities, but, as
alleged in the Complaint their religion requires them to comply
with the wishes of the officers of the Church, one of whom is
the Corporation of the President, who in turn owns Zions
Securities. These allegations must be taken as true at this stage
of the proceedings. Neither defendant, Corporation of the
President, nor defendant Zions Securities cite any cases or
other authorities in their Brief where a contrary doctrine is
announced. What has just been said about the sale of the City
property at First South and State Streets applies to the Forest
Dale Park property.
Nor does the Corporation of the President nor Zions
Securities question the soundness of the law announced by this
Court in the case of Rawley v. Milford City, 352 Pac. (2d) 225.
In their original Brief, paragraph 13, Appellants have
set out the proceedings had in the attempted sale of the property
here involved, and to further clarify the proceedings of the
attempted sale of both the First South and State Street property
and the Forest Dale Park Appellants sought to amend the
Complaint by adding thereto the language set out on page 14
of their original Brief.
From a reading of the Briefs of Counsel for the Corporation of the President, Zions Securities, and of Salt Lake City
and its Commissioners, it will be seen that they digress from the
allegations of the Complaint by stating purported facts foreign
to the allegations of the Complaint, and then cite law which
they claim applies to the assumed facts.
Thus, on page 35 of the Brief of the Corporation of the
7
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President it is stated that over the years the L.D.S. Church has
made contributions to various funds of charities which are not
confined to its members. It is difficult to see how such fact,
if it be a fact, has any bearing on this case. We again direct
the attention of the Court to the provisions of the Articles of
the Corporation of the President which provide: That the
assets of the Corporation of the President are held in trust "for
the benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, a religious society for the benefit of religion,
for works of charity and for public worship"
The only function served by the words "a religious society
for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public
worship" is to define the nature of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, which is not being sued. Moreover,
neither the L.D.S. Church nor the Corporation of the President
has any authority under the guise of charity to use its assets
in the purchase of a Federal Building. Our search fails to find
a case so holding. The authorities are to the contrary. See 76
C.]S. 780, and 45 Am. ]ur., pages 760-761, Sec. 49-50, and cases
there cited. We have examined the cited cases, none of which
lend any color to the claim that the property of a religious
society may be used to aid in the purchase of a Federal Building.
Nor is there any language in the Complaint from which it
may be inferred that the money which is to be advanced toward
the purchase of a Federal Building is intended as a charity.
Thus it is alleged in paragraph 13 of the Complaint that
$750,000.00 is to be paid for the property at First South and
State Streets, and that if possession is not given on or before
March 23, I960, the price shall be reduced to $725,000.00. A
check for $15,000.00 which accompanied the bid was, at the
8
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option of the holders, io be returned if an action were brought
to set aside the sale, or J/I election called to question its validity.
It is further alleged in paragraph 20 iu ) and (d) of the
Complaint that neither defendant, Corporation of rhe President, nor defendant, Zions Securities, had at the time complained of any right or Aniinuay to purchase or select a site
for a Federal Building. If defendants, Corporation of the
President, or Zions Securities, are about to give money as an
act of charity as defined by ihe authorities, that is a matter
peculiarly within their knowledge, and therefore, required to
assert such a claim in their Answer. If we are not misinformed,
the proposed advancement of several hundred thousand dollars
toward the purchase of a site for a Federal Building has none
of the characteristics of a ihanty. We shall have more to say
about this phase of the ease later in this Brief.
Apparently defendant City and its Commissioners believed
that there were allegations in the Complaint which required
an Answer, otherwise, they would not have done so. However,
in their Brief they seek to establish their defense to the judgment
dismissing the First Cause of Action by stating what they
claim to be the facts without the necessity of offering proof
in support thereof. Thus it is alleged on page 20 of the City
Brief that the City property was sold for a fair price, that at
a public hearing held on December 29, 1929, the adequacy
of the structure was fairly and carefully discussed, and it was
the general consensus that such buildings were inadequate and
obsolete.
What we have already said requires a reversal -.••: oa
Judgment appealed from. Richards P, Anderson, 337 Fat. (2d)
9
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59, 9 Utah (2d) 17. Welchman v. Wood, 337 Pac. 410, 353
Pac. (2d) 165.
We quote the following from the opinion written by
Justice Wade in the case of Welchman v. Wood, supra:
''Since the court did not hear all the evidence and did
not make any findings of fact, this decision, the same
as a summary judgment, should be reversed if defendants have failed to show that 'there is no genuine issue
as to any material facts, and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'
In the case of Pender v. Alix, et al., not yet reported,
Chief Justice Crockett, in a dissent, said:
"It should be kept uppermost in mind that this is a
review of a summary judgment, that it is a drastic
remedy which deprives the party of the opportunity
to present his evidence, and which the courts, therefore should be extremely reluctant to grant."
However, in light of the following provision of Rule 76,
we deem it proper to discuss the other points raised by the
Respondent. It is there provided that:
"If a new trial is granted, the court shall pass upon
and determine all questions of law involved in the case
presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final
determination of the case."
We shall, therefore, discuss the various points raised by Respondents.
POINT ONE
THE PROPERTY OWNED BY THE CORPORATION
OF THE PRESIDENT AND ZIONS SECURITIES CONIC
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STITUTE A PRIVATE TRUST AND NOT A PUBLIC
CHARITABLE TRUST.
We again direct the attention of the Court to the law of
Utah pursuant to which the Corporation of the President was
created. U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-1, Corporations Sole may be formed
for acquiring, holding or disposing of church or religious
society property "for the benefit of religion, for works of
charity and for public worship in the manner hereinafter provided."
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-2, provides for the manner in which
a corporation sole may be organized and the persons who may
become a corporation sole.
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-3, provides for what shall be provided
for in the Articles of Incorporation, among which provisions
is (2) The object of the corporation.
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-6, provides for the power that such a
corporation may exercise, among which are: ( l ) To acquire
and possess by donation, gift, bequest, devise or purchase,
and to hold and maintain property, real and personal and
mixed, and to grant, sell, convey, rent or otherwise dispose
of the same as may be necessary to carry on or promote the
objects of the corporation. (4) To sue and be sued.
The law seems to be uniformly settled that the powers of
a corporation are such and only such as are provided for in
its Articles of Incorporation. North Point C.I. Co. v. Utah
S.L.C. Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 168; Getzhoffen v. Hospital,
32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 691; Carey, et al, v. St. Joe Mining Co.,
32 Utah 49, 91 Pac. 369; Miller v. Peruvian Consol. Min. Co.,
11
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et al, 79 Utah 401, 11 Pac. (2d) 291. That is the law generally.
18 C.J.S., Sec. 22, page 400, et seq.
It is apparently the contention of Counsel for both the
Corporation of the President and Zions Securities that the
money which is to be used to assist in the purchase of a Federal
Building is money which may properly be used for a public
charity by the Corporation of the President and/or Zions
Securities, and that the plan is to expend the money as an act
of charity to the United States. There are various reasons why
such a claim must fail. Among which are: There is nothing
in the allegation of the Complaint which shows or tends to
show that either the Corporation of the President or Zions
Securities intend to assist in the purchase of a site for a Federal
Building as an act of charity. The provisions of the Articles
of Incorporation of the President heretofore cited are to the
contrary. While nothing is alleged in the Complaint as to
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of Zions Securities, it is in substance stated in the Brief filed herein, that it is
an ordinary corporation organized for profit. That being so it
is without authority to use its assets for charitable purposes.
Of course, the Court may not take judicial notice of the contents
of the Articles of Incorporation of Zions Securities. If the
Court could take judicial notice of such Articles, it would find
no difficulty in concluding that Zions is without authority to
use its funds for acts of charity.
In our original Brief we stated that it appears that the
L.D.S. Church, the Corporation of the President and Zions
Securities are so interwoven that in effect they are one organization. Counsel for the Corporation of the President and Zions
Securities contend to the contrary.
12
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It is alleged in paragraph 20(b) and 21(g) that Zions
Securities is without authority to use its assets for charitable
purposes or to otherwise assist in the purchase of a site for
a Federal Building. How stands the case with respect to the
Corporation of the President?
One of the divisions into which the authorities divide
express Trusts are: Private Trusts and Public Charitable Trusts.
Among the essential elements of an express trust, whether
private of charitable, are: that there be property to which the
trust applies, a trustee and a beneficiary. In this case the
property is that held by the Corporation of the President,
which includes the assets of Zions Securities because the former
owns the latter. The Trustee is the Corporation of the President
who is the successor in title and interest of property formerly
held by the President of the L.D.S. Church as trustee in trust
of its funds. The beneficiaries are the members of the L.D.S.
Church. It is so provided in the Articles of Incorporation of
the President. There is no basis for a controversy as to the
fact that the Corporation of the President is the trustee of the
funds here involved, or, if there is such a controversy, it
cannot be resolved on a mere motion to dismiss the Complaint.
In light of a number of the cases cited in the Briefs of some
of the Respondents, there seems to be a controversy as to what
the trustee may lawfully do with the funds which he holds
in trust. It is, of course, of the very essence of a trust that the
trustee must apply the trust fund to the purposes for which
he holds the fund. That if he fails to do so, recourse may be
had by the proper parties to secure compliance with the terms
of the document creating or acknowledging the trust. 54 Am.
]ur., Sec. 36, page 47, in which it is said:
13
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"No trust can exist in respect o£ property where the
holder of the legal title can under its present disposition withdraw it from the trust and apply it unqualifiedly to his own use or to any object that he chooses.
In other words, there is no property or fund which
can be the subject matter of a trust where its application
to the purpose of the trust depends upon the absolute
and unconditional discretion of the person in control
of the property or fund. Unbridled discretion in a
trustee not only negatives the necessary separation of
legal and equitable ownership, but is also objectionable
insofar as the existence of a trust is concerned by reason
of the uncertainty that it involves.''
Numerous state and federal cases are cited in footnotes to
the ttxt We shall not undertake a review of the cases there
cited because we believe the law to be as therein stated so well
settled that its soundness is not open to serious doubt.
Cases are cited in the Brief of Counsel for Zions Securities
and the Corporation of the President wherein it is held that
conveyance made to a trustee to be used for various kinds of
public purposes have been sustained on the ground that the
same are charitable acts. We have no quarrel with such cases
or the law there announced. It will, however, be noted that
in those cases the instrument creating the trust directs the
purposes for which the trust property is to be used. Indeed,
in the absence of some expressed or reasonably inferred direction in the instrument creating the trust fund, there would
be no way of either the trustee or the courts to determine the
purposes for which the trust fund is to be used.
A charitable trust has been variously defined. That matter
is discussed at length in 14 C.J.S., Sec. 37, page 470; Boquist
U
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on Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 2A, Sees. 361 to 390, pages 3, et
seq.; 10 Am. ]ur. 584 to 590. Numerous cases are cited in the
footnotes to the text, but it would prolong this Brief beyond
reasonable limits and would serve no useful purpose to review
those cases. The distinction made by the authorities and cases
is thus stated in 10 Am. ]ur. 589:
"The requisites of a valid private trust and of one
for a charitable use are materially different. In the
former there must be not only a certain trustee who
holds the legal title, but a certain specified cestue que
trust clearly identified, or made capable of identification by the terms of the instrument creating the trust,
while it is an essential feature of the latter that the
beneficiaries are uncertain, a class of persons described
in some general language, often fluctuating, changing
in their individual members and partaking of a quasipublic character."
The facts in this case as alleged in the Complaint clearly
bring the funds which Respondents, Corporation of the President, or its owned Zions Securities, propose to use to assist
in the purchase of a Federal Building within the class of a
Private Trust as defined by the authorities. The cases cited,
in which the L.D.S. Church and the United States were involved,
on page 40 of Appellants' original Brief support the view that
the funds here brought in question are in the nature of a
private trust in which only members of the L.D.S. Church
may participate. Moreover, it is argued by some of the Respondents that defendant, Zions Securities, is a corporation
organized for profit. If that be so, it may not dispose of its
property for charity.
There are cases such as Sales v. Southern Trust Company,
15
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185 S.W. (2d) 623, 182 Tenn. 270, and Stainer v. Burton,
17 Utah 331, 52 Pac. 1015, which hold that a religious society
has such implied powers as are necessarily to be inferred from
those expressly granted. To say that the Corporation of the
President or Zions Securities has an implied power to do what
it is alleged in the Complaint, they are attempting to do is
stretching the language of the Articles of the Corporation of
the President far beyond the breaking point. It is argued on
pages 34 and 35 of the Brief of the Corporation of the President that its Articles permit it to use its funds for four purposes,
namely:
" 1 . For the benefit of its members.
2. For the benefit of religion.
3. For works of charity.
4. For purpose of worship."
If the four purposes just mentioned may be said to be
for the sole benefit of the members of the L.D.S. Church, there
is no conflict with that provision of the Articles of the Corporation of the President which provides that its funds are to
be used "for the benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints." Doubtless Counsel for the Corporation of the President will not contend that the Corporation
of the President may lawfully use the assets held by it for
the benefit of any other religion, or for purposes of worship
other than for members of the L.D.S. Church. If such a
contention were made, according to our search no authority
can be found to support such a novel contention. If the words
"for the benefit of religion" and for purposes of charity is
not limited to the members of the L.D.S. Church it necessarily
16
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follows that the words 'Tor works of charity'' are also so
limited.
Moreover, if the fund which it is proposed to be used
in the purchase of a Federal Building is a trust fund as alleged
in Appellant's pleadings, and as apparently conceded in the
Briefs of the Corporation of the President, and as found by
the Supreme Courts of both the United States and this Court
in the cases cited on page 40 of Appellant's Brief, it necessarily
follows that the works of charity must be confined to the
members of the L.D.S. Church. The authorities teach that if
the person who has control of property has unbridled discretion
to dispose of such property to such purposes as he pleases,
there is no trust. Thus if the Corporation of the President
may lawfully use such property, which he holds for the benefit
of the members of the L.D.S. Church, to aid any religious
organization or work of charity that he chooses, then and if
that be so, the words for the benefit of the members of the
L.D.S. Church is rendered meaningless, and the fund may not
be said to be a trust fund. See 54 Am. ]ur., Sec. 36, page 47,
and the cases there cited, heretofore called to the attention
of the Court in this Brief.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED
AGAINST DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
Under Points One, Two and Four of the Brief of the
Corporation of the President it is argued that plaintiff's Com17
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plaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim upon
which relief can be granted because the plaintiff is not a member
of the L.D.S. Church.
In our original Brief we have discussed various grounds
which preclude the Corporation of the President from participating in the purchase of both the First South and State
Street property and the Forest Dale property. One of such
grounds common to the transactions is that the members of
the City Commission are interested in the Corporation of the
President, and as such are disqualified from participating in
a sale or contract to sell City property, and any agreement to
dispose of city property under such conditions is void as provided by U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38. We have discussed that phase
of the case under Point Four, pages 31 to 42, of our original
Brief.
In order to keep within reasonable limits we confined our
quotations from only a few of the numerous cases and authorities, but have cited a long list of cases and other authorities on
pages 38, 39 and 40 of the Brief.
It should be kept in mind that the plaintiff brings this
action for himself and all other persons similarly situated,
which in legal effect is an action by all the taxpayers of Salt
Lake City. It will be seen that the numerous cases cited in our
original Brief are prosecuted by taxpayers and so far as we
are able to ascertain no action has been dismissed on the
ground that the taxpayer may not maintain such an action
because they are not parties in interest. Indeed, if the taxpayers
may not maintain such an action, then it would seem to necessarily follow that in most cases no one could maintain such an
18
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action, with the result that city officers would have unlimited
authority to do as they choose with city property. Surely that
cannot be the law. In his Complaint plaintiff also alleges that
compliance was not had with the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
10-7-2 and 10-8-8 of the laws of Utah. We have discussed
that phase of the case under Point One of Appellant's Brief.
The Corporation of the President apparently concedes that
to be the law, because it does not cite any authorities to the
contrary. If it agrees that such is the law, its remedy is to
consent to a judgment to the effect that it claims no interest
in either a contract to purchase the Forest Dale Park or in the
purported sale of the property at First South and State Streets.
If neither the Corporation of the President nor its owned Zions
Securities claim any personal interest in the matter of the
disposal of the properties here involved, and do not intend
to contribute to the purchase of a site for a Federal Building,
then and under such circumstances there would be merit to
their claim that plaintiff and other taxpayers of Salt Lake
City have no just cause to complain against them.
There are a number of other allegations in the Complaint
which, if true, entitles plaintiff to the relief sought. We shall
defer discussing those until later in this Brief. During the
discussion of this case in the court below Counsel for plaintiff
conceded that it is doubtful if he may be heard to complain
as to the manner in which the funds of the Corporation of the
President and Zions Securities are being expended so long
as such expenditure does not affect the rights of the taxpayers.
However, if city property is being disposed of contrary to law
with the use of trust funds and by persons who are disqualified
from acting, plaintiff has a right to complain without regard
19
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to whether or not the taxpayers will suffer. U.C.A. 1953,
10-6-38, so provides, as do the adjudicated cases cited in our
original Brief.
POINT THREE
A CORPORATION IS BOUND BY ITS ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION.
Under Point Five of the Brief of the Corporation of the
President cases are cited to the effect that gifts to a religious
or charitable corporation for the purpose of carrying out the
purposes for which the corporation was organized does not
create a trust in any legal sense. The law announced in those
cases does not apply to the facts alleged in the Complaint.
The L.D.S. Church is not being sued. The Articles of the
Corporation of the President expressly provide that its property
is held for the benefit of the members. A corporation is bound
by the terms of its Articles of Incorporation, not by what is
said in its Brief, especially where there is no evidence to support
what is there said. The cases decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States and by this Court involving the property
of the L.D.S. Church cited on page 40 of Appellant's original
Brief, hold that the funds given to the Church are trust funds
to be used solely for the benefit of members of the L.D.S.
Church. The cases cited by Respondent under its Point Five
are not to the contrary. In our somewhat extended search of
the authorities we have not found a case which supports or
tends to support a religious organization using funds contributed by its members for the purchase of a site for a Federal
Building, or any building other than those used for religious
purposes of the Church of the donor.
20
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POINT FOUR
THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT
ACQUIRE TITLE TO PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER THE
PRETEXT THAT IT IS TO BE USED AS A SITE FOR A
FEDERAL BUILDING AND THEN SEEK TO ACQUIRE
OTHER PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.
Under Point Three of the Brief of the Corporation of the
President it is asserted that it "is wholly specious and frivilous"
to contend that such Corporation is estopped from seeking to
secure two sites for a Federal Building when only one such
building is to be constructed. Needless to say, such characterization does not serve any useful purpose. On page 50 of our
original Brief we have cited 19 Am. ]ur., Page 650, Sec. 50,
where it is in effect said that a party may not take an inconsistent position, and that he is estopped from so doing. On
page 14 and 15 of the Brief of the Corporation of the President
is cited 19 Am. ]ur.} pages 732 to 735, which is to the effect
that one claiming an estoppel must show that he has changed
his position on account of the acts complained of, and that
estoppel rests largely upon injury or prejudice to the rights of
him who asserts it. There are various acts that constitute an
estoppel, one of which is that relied upon by Appellants. If
the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities have a
right, contrary to appellants' contention, to contribute to the
purchase of a site for a Federal Building, the most rudimentary
practice of business requires them to ascertain what property
is acceptable for such purpose. They should not be permitted
to acquire one site for such purpose and then proceed without
surrendering the first site to seek to secure another site. If that
21
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may be done, as to two sites, there is no good reason why it
may not be done as to three or more. The fact that the taxpayers of the school district and of the City of Salt Lake may
be charged by the Corporation of the President with blowing
hot and cold by resisting such procedure does not change the
fact that the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities
should not be permitted to cast the burden of resisting such
unwarranted actions upon the taxpayers of the city and of the
school district.
It is also argued in the Brief of the Corporation of the
President that the appellants may not maintain this action,
that only the Attorney General may maintain the same. In
this proceeding appellants are not attempting to prevent any
corporation from performing its proper functions as a corporation. Appellants are merely seeking redress against the
Respondent Corporations for the invasion of appellants'
property rights, and upon the ground that the transaction
complained of is not authorized by law. See 13 Am. ]ur.,
page 791, Sec. 761, where numerous cases, both state and
federal, are cited in footnotes to the text. It would indeed be
a strange doctrine to hold that if and when the rights of the
taxpayers of Salt Lake City and/or the rights of a beneficiary
of the Trust Fund held by the Corporation of the President
are invaded, the injured party could not bring an action to
redress the wrong. It is not the function of the Attorney
General to prosecute unlawful acts of individuals or corporations which merely result in injury to individuals. The cases
cited by Respondents are not to the contrary.
It is further argued under Point Three of the Brief of
the Corporation of the President that the word "state" used in
22
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Section 4 of Article One of the Constitution of Utah is limited
in its provision to the State of Utah, and has no application
to Salt Lake City. The cities of Utah are an integral part of
or an arm of the state. The cities are creatures of the State.
The means whereby the State carries on many of its functions
of government. To permit a Church to dominate an arm of the
State or interfere with its functions might well result in the
domination of and interference with the entire state. The
state is divided into counties, which together with the cities,
conduct the major part of the government of the state. Thus
if it should be held as contended for in the Brief of the
Corporation of the President, a church is free to dominate
the various counties and cities, and interfere with their functions, there would be but little governmental function left
to be performed by the other departments of the state. It is a
function of the state acting through its cities and counties to
provide for buildings for the officers of the cities and counties,
and for the education of its children. If the provisions of
Section 4 of Article One of the Constitution of Utah is not
to be emasculated such provision must apply to the cities and
counties of the state.
If time and space permitted it may well be profitable to
review the history of the struggle to bring about the concept
in America of the separation of church and state. Suffice it to
say that one of the principal purposes sought to be accomplished by such struggle was to limit the ownership and
control of real estate by the church. A number of the states
continue to limit the amount of real property that a church
may own. See Boquist on Trusts and Trutsees, Vol. 2, Chapter
17.
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POINT FIVE
THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND/OR
ZIONS SECURITIES AND THE FAUSETTS HAVE AN
INTEREST IN THE FUND THAT IS INTENDED TO BE
USED TO PURCHASE A FEDERAL BUILDING, AND
THEREFORE PROPER, IF NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION.
It is argued under Point Four of the Brief of the Corporation of the President that plaintiff has no interest in the
funds of the Corporation of the President, and that by the
plan alleged in the Complaint the Corporation of the President
and/or its owned corporation, Zions Securities, are the mere
conduit through which the property is conveyed to the United
States.
We concede that it is doubtful if plaintiff has a right to
complain solely upon the ground that trust funds are to be
used in the selection of a site for a Federal Building. That is
the reason the Fausetts should be permitted to intervene. The
contention that the Corporation of the President and Zions
Securities are merely the conduit through which the property
here involved is to be conveyed to the United States ignores
the allegations of the Complaint. It is alleged in the Complaint
that they are to advance several hundred thousand dollars
to assist in the purchase of a site for a Federal Building. They
are thus more than a conduit, and having an interest in the
subject matter of this litigation are necessary parties. It is so
held by the authorities heretofore cited in this Brief. Moreover,
there is no allegation in the Complaint that justifies an inference
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that either the Corporation of the President or Zions Securities
may lawfully act as a real estate broker.
POINT SIX
THE FAUSETTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED
TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE.
On page 42 of Appellants' original Brief we have discussed
the right of the Fausetts to intervene. Attention is there called
to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is said on
page 28 of the Brief of the Corporation of the President that
' T o permit the Fausetts to intervene would be the equivalent
of bringing in a new cause of action based upon issues of law
and fact not involved in the main action." It is in effect alleged
in the Complaint that under the agreement complained of
assets which are held in trust are to be used for the purchase
of a site for a Federal Building, and that neither the Corporation of the President nor Zions Securities have any right to
use such funds for such purpose. See paragraphs 7 and 20(b)
of the Complaint. Such allegations, if denied, constitute an
issue, and if admitted, entitle plaintiff to prevail.
Cases are cited in the Brief of the Corporation of the
President construing the provisions of Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules and Procedure. As we read the case cited by Respondent
on pages 28 and 29, they do not support the contentions of
Respondents in this action. The correct rule is stated in Pure
Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 Fed. (2d) 651, where it is held that all
persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially,
in the subject matter of a suit should be parties so that there
may be a complete decree that will bind all interested parties.
25
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A number of United States Supreme Court and other
Federal cases are there cited which support such view. Tested
by the foregoing Rule the Fausetts are not only proper but
necessary parties to this action. In light of the fact that Respondents have indicated their desire to have an early decision
of this action, we are at a loss to understand why they seek
to prevent the Fausetts from intervening unless they believe
that neither the Fausetts or any other member of the L.D.S.
Church will bring an action against the Corporation of the
President.
POINT SEVEN
IT IS NOT OF CONTROLLING IMPORTANCE AS
TO WHETHER OR NOT ZIONS SECURITIES IS THE
ALTER EGO OF THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
In answer to Point Seven of the Corporation of the President, it is of little, if indeed any, importance as to whether
or not Zions Securities is the Alter Ego of the Corporation of
the President, so far as this action is concerned.
Even if the allegations of the Complaint should be held
to fail to show that Zions Securities is the alter ego of the
Corporation of the President, such fact would not aid Respondents or justify a dismissal of this action as to them, or
any of the Respondents. As alleged in the Complaint, the two
corporations seem to be one organization. Zions Securities is
the mere means whereby the Corporation of the President
can carry out its business activities. But even if the two corporations are separate entites, neither of them has, according
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to the allegations of the Complaint, authority to use their funds
to assist in the purchase of a site for a Federal Building.

POINT EIGHT
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT SHOW
THAT IT IS A BREACH OF TRUST TO USE THE FUNDS
THAT ARE HELD FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE L.D.S. CHURCH FOR THE PURCHASE OF
A FEDERAL BUILDING.
We have discussed this phase of the case at some length
in our original Brief, and shall attempt to avoid a repetition
of what we have heretofore said. It may again be observed
that there is recited in the Brief of the Corporation of the
President what is claimed to be facts which, if material at
all, belong in an Answer and not in support of a Motion to
Dismiss a Complaint. It is argued that the L.D.S. Church has
done much to aid in the development of Utah. Even so, does
that justify the use of trust funds to assist in the purchase of
a site for a Federal Building? The Congress of the United
States has appropriated the necessary money to purchase a
site and construct a Federal Building. It is true that a Federal
Building will be a benefit to the citizens of Salt Lake without
regard to their religious affiliations. That was true when it
was suggested that money formerly held in trust by the same
Church might be used for the support of the common schools.
However, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court
held in the cases cited on page 40 of our original Brief that
such money may not be so used. The case of Stainer v. Burton,
17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015, is cited as authority for the claim
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that the funds which are held in trust for the members of the
L.D.S. Church may be used to assist in the purchase of a
Federal Building. That case makes against rather than supports
Respondents' contention. In that case Stainer made a Will
wherein he directed that after the death of his wife the Presiding Bishop should receive one-half of his estate in trust
for the benefit of the members of the L.D.S. Church, whether
it be for public schools, parks, watering cities, acclimatizing
foreign plants, or anything else whereby the members may be
benefitted. It was held that the clause "anything else whereby
the members may be benefitted" was meant that the uses to
which the estate might be put were similar to those expressed.
The Court there recognized the rule that if a charitable trust
is to be sustained, the purposes for which the trust property
shall be used must be designated. In this case the property
held by the Corporation of the President was to be used for the
benefit of the members of the L.D.S. Church. There is no
language in the Articles of Incorporation of the President
which even remotely authorize it to use its funds for any
purpose other than for the benefit of the members of the
L.D.S. Church.
We have a statue, U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-11, which provides
that words and phrases are to be construed according to the
context and the approved uses of language except as to technical
words and phrases and others which have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in law, etc.
As ordinarily used the word charity may not be said to
apply to the expenditure of money for the purchase of a site
for a public building. Indeed counsel for Respondents have
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not so contended until they filed their Brief in this case. It
will also be noted that in the complaint filed herein, it is
alleged that the tarnsactions were sales. In the city's Brief it
is argued that the transaction touching the property at First
South and State Street was a sale. See Cache Auto Co. vs.
Central Garage, 63 Utah 10; 221 Pac. 862, for a discussion of
that provision.
POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO DEFENDANT, CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT.
It will be seen in Point Nine of the Brief of the Corporation of the President a statement is made of facts which
may have some bearing on the case if set out in an Answer,
but serve no proper function in support of a Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint. Nothing is said about the law as construed
by this Court that the enactment of an ordinance is a prerequisite to the sale of real property belonging to a city. Likewise, the Brief is silent as to Appellant's claim that the agreement is void because the City Commissioners were disqualified
from voting to sell city property in which they had an interest
as members of the L.D.S. Church, and likewise the Brief is
silent as to the law which makes the Corporation of the
President an indispensable party to a suit involving the sale
of the Forest Dale property.
POINT TEN
BOTH THE PLAINTIFF AND THE FAUSETTS HAVE
A STANDING IN COURT TO SUE ZIONS SECURITIES.
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Much of what has been said in this Brief in answer to the
contention of the Corporation of the President applies to Point
One of the Brief of Zions Securities. While the claim that
plaintiff being a non-member of the L.D.S. Church may, under
some circumstances, preclude him from complaining of the
manner in which the funds of Zions Securities are being used,
that is not so under facts such as are alleged in the Complaint,
and the proposed Complaint In Intervention.
Plaintiff being a taxpayer in Salt Lake City has a right to
attack both transactions affecting the First South and State
Streets property and the Forest Dale Park because of the conflict of interest as a member of the City Commission and as
beneficiaries of the Corporation of the President, a part of
which is Zions Securities. As we have heretofore pointed out,
a beneficiary of a trust fund has an interest in such trust fund.
Many of th cases cited by Respondent, Zions Securities, hold
that the beneficiaries may maintain an action to force compliance by the trustee with the terms under which he holds
such funds. Such is the law announced by the authorities
generally. Boquist on Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1, page 274,
and the cases cited on page 48 of Appellants' original Brief.
Indeed, if no one may be heard to complain because a trustee
fails to carry out the terms of the trust, the trustee could do
as may suit his fancy with the funds entrusted to him. In this
case the Fausetts seek to enforce the terms of the trust for
and on behalf of all the beneficiaries. That being so, the
case stands the same as if all the beneficiaries, that is, all
members of the L.D.S. Church, were here seeking the relief
which the Fausetts seek.
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It is the contention of some of the Respondents that if
the Corporation of the President is to be compelled to carry
out the terms of the trust, it must be by the Attorney General.
If the trust is what the authorities define as a Public Charitable
Trust, the cases hold that the Attorney General is a proper
party to bring an action to enforce the same. The facts in this
case do not bring it within that class of cases. A trust for the
benefit of the members of the L.D.S. Church is not a public
charitable trust. The only persons who have an interest in
such a trust are the members of the L.D.S. Church. A trust for
them is in no sense a public trust. The public generally is not
interested in such a trust. We have heretofore discussed this
phase of the case and shall not enlarge on what is there said
except to observe that there are a number of cases cited in the
Brief of Respondent which deal with the question of who
owns the property of a church where the church divides into
two or more factions. Counsel for Zions Securities have also
cited a number of cases where the Courts refuse to pass upon
controversies as to purely ecclesiastical matters, such as matters
relating to discipline of its members, whether one has been
properly excommunicated, what is the established doctrine of
the church, etc. None of these matters are here involved. The
courts, however, uniformly hold that they will hear and determine civil rights, such as to who is the owner of the property
used by the church. A number of the cases cited by Counsel
for Zions Securities so hold. We have found no case holding
to the contrary.
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POINT ELEVEN
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT SHOW
THAT THE FAUSETTS AND ZIONS SECURITIES ARE
PROPER PARTIES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Under Point Two of the Brief of Zions Securities it is
argued that the Complaint fails to allege facts which show a
cause of action against it as to the Second Cause of Action.
We again direct the attention of the Court to the allegations
of the Complaint to the efifect that the Corporation of the
President and Zions Securities is one organization, that no
ordinance or proper Resolution was passed as by law required
to sell Forest Dale Park, that because of the City Commissioners
being beneficiaries of the trust fund held by the Corporation
of the President and/or Zions Securities, the Commissioners
were disqualified from participation in a contract to sell Forest
Dale.
Under Point Two it is argued that a donor of a trust loses
his rights to the property so donated. We do not contend to
the contrary, but we do contend that he does not lose the right
to maintain an action on behalf of himself and all other
beneficiaries of the trust to enforce the performance of the
trust. Cases are cited in the Brief of Zions Securities where
gifts to construct various kinds of public improvements have
been sustained on the ground that such gifts may be sustained
in an attack by the heirs of the donors on the ground that the
same is a public charity. Such cases do not aid the contention
of Counsel for Zions Securities under the facts alleged in the
pleadings in this case.
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It is fundamental in the law of trusts that it is the donor
and not the trustee who determines the purposes for which
the donated property shall be used. Of course, the assets of the
Corporation of the President may be used for the purchase of
property to be used for religious purposes. The Fausetts adopt
all of the allegations of the Complaint, and, therefore, what
we have said in reply to the Brief of the Corporation of the
President is applicable to and adopted as a reply to the Brief
of Zions Securities.

POINT TWELVE
SALT LAKE CITY MAY NOT SELL CITY PROPERTY
IN THE MANNER ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.
Under Point One of the Brief of defendant City and its
Commissioners it is argued that the sale of the First South
and State Street property and the Forest Dale Park may be
made in any manner that suits their fancy. Cases are cited
which it is claimed support such contention. We have heretofore in this Brief discussed that phase of the case and adopt
what has heretofore been said in support of Appellants' reply
to Point One of the Brief of the City and its Commissioners.
None of the cases cited in support of the contention of the
City and its Commissioners involve any statutory provisions
such as we have in Utah. The Brief of the City and its Commissioners recites what they claim to be the facts in support
of the Motion to Dismiss the First Cause of Action. Obviously
it may not be assumed that the mere recital of claimed facts
in a Brief establish the existence of the same.
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It is argued that the Complaint is defective in that it is
not alleged that plaintiff will sustain a loss if the sale of the
City property is consummated. Cases are cited, which they
claim support such contention. The authorities generally are
to the contrary where, as here, the sale is declared void or
where compliance is not had with law. We have cited numerous
cases and authorities in our original Brief on pages 38 and 39
thereof, which announced the law in such particular.
It is said on page 19 of the Brief of the City and its
Commissioners that "They (Commissioners) can be members
of churches and have dealings with those churches. Otherwise
only atheists who were complete social outcasts and owed allegiance to no one could hold public office.'' No one contends
that people who belong to a religion may not hold office, but
we do contend that whether a city officer be an atheist or
belongs to a religion, he must comply with the law and may
not use his public office in aid of his religion or enter into a
contract wherein his interests as a member of the church to
which he belongs conflicts with his duties as a public officer.
It is so provided in our statutory law, and that is the uniform
holding of the court under the common law.
The foregoing contention made on page 19 of the Brief
of the City and its Commissioners to the effect that the City
Commissioners who are members of the L.DS.. Church should
not be precluded from complying with the desires of their
church while performing their duties as Commissioners would
be familiar argument if the clock could be turned back a few
centuries to the time of the struggle between the Church and
the State as to which should be in control of temporal matters
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with the result that the Church usually prevailed. However,
that doctrine has never prevailed in the United States since the
adoption of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Such doctrine is also condemned by Section 4
of Article One of the Constitution of Utah, and the provisions
of U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38. The former provides that there be no
union of Church and State, and no church shall dominate the
state or interfere with its functions. The latter provides that
no officer of any municipal corporation shall be directly or
indirectly interested in a contract made by the city of which
he is an officer and any such contract shall be void. It will be
unfortunate for the State of Utah if it ever departs from that
doctrine.
Counsel for the City seems to be laboring under the false
impression that Stone is the sole plaintiff in the main action,
and that the Fausetts are the sole persons seeking to intervene.
Under the pleadings the action stands as if all the taxpayers of
Salt Lake City are parties to the action brought by Stone, and
all of the members of the L.D.S. Church as well as the taxpayers of Salt Lake City are parties to the attempt of the
Fausetts to intervene.
POINT THIRTEEN
BOTH THE PLAINTIFF AND THE FAUSETTS HAVE
A RIGHT TO QUESTION THE SALE OF CITY PROPERTY.
Under Point Three of the Brief of the City and its Commissioners it is argued that plaintiff is without right to question
the method by which the Commissioners sell city property.
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The attention of the Court is again directed to the fact that in
legal effect this is an action brought by all of the taxpayers
of Salt Lake City. It is said in the Brief of the City and its
Commissioners that the remedy of the taxpayers is at the ballot
box. Obviously any action that the taxpayers may take at the
next election will not aid them in the relief which they are
seeking in this action. The numerous cases we have cited in
our original Brief show that they are entilted to the relief
which they seek in this action.

POINT FOURTEEN
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO THE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND IN REFUSING THE PETITION OF
THE FAUSETTS TO INTERVENE.
It is contended in the Brief of the Chamber of Commerce
and Gus P. Backman, its Secretary, that neither Stone nor the
Fausetts possess any interest in the Chamber of Commerce,
and, therefore, may not prosecute this action against them.
We have heretofore discussed this phase of the case at some
length and shall not repeat what is there said, except to state
that we adopt what has already been said as a reply to the
contention of the Chamber of Commerce and its Secretary.
If the contention of the Chamber of Commerce to the effect
that neither plaintiff nor the Fausetts may be heard to complain because of the actions of the Chamber of Commerce
because they were not members thereof, then it follows that
the only ones that may question the unlawful acts of the
Chamber of Commerce are its members. We do not understand
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that to be the law, and the cases cited in the Brief of those
Respondents do not support or tend to support such view.
The real parties in interest, as we have pointed out, are
the taxpayers of Salt Lake City and the beneficiaries of the
trust fund which is to be used to assist in the purchase of a site
for a Federal Building. The Respondents, Chamber of Commerce and Gus P. Backman, are, according to the allegations
of the Complaint and the proposed Complaint in Intervention,
assisting in the unlawful usese of trust funds, and in seeking
to consummate a deal whereby the property of Salt Lake City
may be disposed of by a City Commission whose members are
disqualified from participating in an unlawful sale of city
property. It is the taxpayers and the beneficiaries of the trust
fund who are, through Stone and the Fausetts, prosecuting
this action. Respondents concede that there are no allegations
in the Complaint or the proposed Complaint in Intervention
showing that the Chamber of Commerce took any part in the
transaction for the sale of Forest Dale.
CONCLUSION
Appellants claim that the trial court was in error in dismissing the First Cause of Action, and in dismissing the Second
Cause of Action as to defendants other than the Chamber
of Commerce and Gus P. Backman, and in refusing to permit
the Fausetts to file their complaint in intervention, and in failing
to permit Appellants to file their Amendment to the Complaint
for the following reasons:
1. That the attempted sale of both the First South and
State Street property and the Forest Dale Park was invalid
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for the reason that no Ordinance or proper Resolution was
passed permitting said sale.
2. That the proceedings had in the attempted sale of the
property at First South and State Streets were so irregular in
the matter of giving notice in the terms of the attempted sale
and in the persons to whom the sale was to be made, that the
same is a nullity.
3. That the attempted sale of both of the City properties
here involvel are void under the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
10-6-38, in that, all, or a majority, of the members of the City
Commission who participated in the attempted sale were disqualified from participating in the sale of the City property.
4. That the Respondents, Corporation of the President
and Zions Securities, may not lawfully use their assets to assist
in the purchase of a Federal Building because such funds are
held in trust for the benefit and use of the members of the
L.D.S. Church.
5. That Respondents, Corporation of the President and
Zions Securities, are estopped from seeking to purchase the site
at First South and State Streets for a Federal Building because
they have secured title to the Lafayette School site upon the
pretext that the same is to be used as a site for a Federal Building, and only one such building is presently contemplated by
the United States.
6. That to permit the Corporation of the President and
Zions Securities by the payment of several hundred thousand
dollars to induce an officer of the United States to select a site
for a Federal Building which is satisfactory to the Corporation
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of the President and Zions Securities, constitute an invasion
of the provisions of Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution
of Utah.
7. That to permit the Corporation of the President and
Zions Securities to divert the trust fund held by them to enrich
the United States will constitute the taking of the property of
the beneficiaries of such fund, contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Sections 7
and 22 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah.
8. That to permit the dismissal of the Second Cause of
Action as to the Corporation of the President will render it
impossible to try such cause.
9. That to permit the dismissal of the First Cause of
Action as to the Chamber of Commerce and Gus P. Backman
will render it impossible to try that action.
10. That to deny the Petition of the Fausetts to intervene
will render it impossible to secure a complete determination of
the rights of the parties to this action.
Appellants are entitled to be heard, if need be, to offer
evidence in support of each and all of the foregoing matters,
and if the evidence supports the same, to have judgment entered
in their favor as prayed for in their pleadings.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
BURTON W. MUSSER
Attorneys for Appellant and
Petitioners in Intervention
and Appellants
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